The rst essay discusses, in nontechnical terms, the paradox implicit in de ning a random integer as one without remarkable properties, and the resolution of that paradox at the cost of making randomness a property which most integers have but can't be proved to have. The second essay brie y reviews the search for randomness in the the digit sequences of natural irrational numbers like and arti cial ones like Champernowne's C = 0:12345678910111213:::; and discusses at length Chaitin's de nable-but-uncomputable number , whose digit sequence is so random that no betting strategy could succeed against it. Other, Cabalistic properties of are pointed out for the rst time.
Berry's Paradox and the Unprovability of Randomness
The number 1,101,121 is unusual in that it is, or appears to be, the number named by the expression the rst number not nameable in under ten words. However, since the italicized expression has only nine words, there is an inconsistency in regarding it as a name for 1,101,121 or any other number. This paradox, a variant of one due to Russell and Berry 1 , shows that the concept of nameability or de nability is too vague and powerful to be used without restriction. Because of it, the \function" N (x) = the number of English words required to name the integer x must be regarded as ill-de ned for all but nitely many x. Martin Gardner 2 has pointed out that a similar paradox arises when one attempts to classify numbers as \interesting" or \dull": there can be no dull numbers, because, if there were, the rst of them would be interesting on that account. Berry's paradox can be avoided and tamed by restricting nameability to mean describability as output of an algorithm or computer program. Consider the function C(x) = the number of bits in the smallest program to compute the integer x. A (binary) integer p is said to be a program to compute x when some standard universal computer, given p as its sole input, computes x as its sole output, afterward halting. In this case there can be no doubt that p indeed describes x. Since every integer admits such a description, C(x) is well-de ned for all x. However, to avoid Berry's paradox, it must be concluded that the function C(x) is itself uncomputable. For if C(x) were computable, one could design a contradictory program q to nd and print out the least number x for which C(x) exceeded the number of bits in q.
Returning to the question of interesting and dull numbers, an interesting number may without paradox be de ned as one computable by a program with fewer bits than the number itself. This short description would attest some special feature of the number, by which it could be distinguished from the general run of numbers. A dull or \random" number, on the other hand, would be one that is algorithmically incompressible. Obviously, most numbers are random in this sense, since, for any n, there are more than twice as many n -bit numbers as ( n?1) -bit numbers available to serve as shorter descriptions. Using this denition of randomness, G. Chaitin 3 demonstrated the following surprising fact, a form of G odel's incompleteness theorem: although most numbers are random, only nitely many of them can be proved random within a given consistent axiomatic system. In particular, a system whose axioms and rules of inference require about n bits to describe cannot prove the randomness of any number much longer than n bits. If the system could prove randomness for a number much longer than n bits, the rst such proof ( rst, that is, in an unending enumeration of all proofs obtainable by repeated application of the axioms and rules of inference) could be manipulated into a contradiction: an approximately n-bit program to nd and print out the speci c random number mentioned in this proof, a number whose smallest program is by de nition considerably longer than n bits.
2 The Search for a \Random" Real Number It has been conjectured that the decimal expansions of irrational numbers such as, , e, and p 2 are random in the sense of being \normal" 4 i.e. that each digit 0 through 9, and indeed each block of digits of any length, occurs with equal asymptotic frequency. It is easy to show that no rational number is normal to any base, and that almost all irrational numbers are normal to every base; but the normality of these most famous irrational numbers remains open. The question cannot be settled by any nite amount of statistical evidence, since an ultimately normal number might begin abnormally (e.g. e = 2.718281828...), or vice versa. Existing evidence 5 shows no signi cant departures from randomness in . e also appears to be normal, though there is some evidence for other statistical irregularities 6 .
In contrast to , whose random-appearing digit sequence mocks the attempt to prove it so, the following very non-random number: C = 0:12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031::: is nevertheless provably normal, to base 10. This number, invented by D. G. Champernowne 7 , consists of the decimal integers written in increasing order (Benoit Mandelbrot has pointed out another number of this sort, whose base-2 normality is implicit in an earlier paper by N. Wiener 8 ). Departures from equidistribution are large in the initial portion of Champernowne's or Wiener's number, but approach zero as the count is extended over more and more of the sequence. It is apparently not known whether these numbers are normal to every base.
Although the digit sequence of may be random in the sense of being normal, it is de nitely not random in the sense of being unpredictable: a good gambler betting against it would eventually infer its rule and thereafter always win, and only a very inept gambler could lose many bets against Champernowne's number. Is there a sequence so random that no computable betting strategy, betting against it at fair odds, can win an in nite gain? Any number that is random in this strong sense is also normal to every base. It is a basic result of probability theory that almost all real numbers are random in this strong sense 9 , but here again we are seeking a speci c random number.
There is, of course, a sense in which no speci cally de nable real number can be random. Since there are uncountably many real numbers but only countably many de nitions, the mere fact that a real number is de nable makes it atypical of real numbers in general. Here, however, we are only seeking a number whose atypicality is unrecognizable by constructive means. In particular, the number we are seeking must not be computable from its de nition; since if it were, that would already imply a perfect betting strategy. One may de ne an uncomputable real number K in terms of the halting problem 1 for programs on some standard universal computer or programming language, setting the n'th binary digit of K to 1 or 0 according to whether the n'th program halts. Although the resulting digit sequence is indeed uncomputable, a gambler could nevertheless make in nite pro t betting against it, by betting only on solvable cases of the halting problem, of which there are in nitely many. G. Chaitin 10 discovered a real number which is uncomputable in the stronger sense needed:
= the halting probability of a universal computer whose program is generated randomly, by tossing a fair coin whenever the computer requests another bit of input.
Clearly, once the universal computer or programming language is speci ed, is a well de ned real number between zero and one. For typical programming languages like Fortran, will be nearer one than zero, since a program generated at random is more likely to halt immediately (e.g. due to a syntax error) than to loop. However, it can be shown that after the rst few digits would look 1 The halting problem, i.e. the problem of distinguishing programs that come to a spontaneous halt from those that run on inde nitely, is the classic unsolvable problem of computability theory. At rst sight the problem might seem solvable since, if a program halts, that fact can certainly be demonstrated by running the program long enough. Moreover there are many programs which can easily be proven to halt or not to halt even without running the program. The di culty comes not in solving particular cases, but in solving the problem in general. It can be shown that there is no e ective prescription for deciding how long to run a program that waits long enough to reveal the halting of all halting programs, nor any consistent system of axioms strong enough to prove the non-halting of all non-halting ones. The unsolvability of the halting problem can be derived from and indeed is equivalent to the fact that most random integers can't be proved random.
quite random, far more than Champernowne's number.
has three related properties that make it unusual: 1. It encodes the halting problem in a very compact form. Knowing its rst few thousand digits would in principle permit the solution of all interesting nitely refutable mathematical conjectures. 2. It is algorithmically incompressible: there exists a constant c such that the rst n bits of are never expressible as the output of a program smaller than n ? c bits.
3. No computable gambling scheme can make in nite pro t betting against it. encodes the halting problem, but in a much more compact form than K: knowing its rst n bits is su cient to solve the halting problem for any program up to n bits in length. Suppose one wishes to solve the halting problem for a particular n-bit program p. The program p corresponds to a particular sequence of n coin tosses having probability 2 ?n ; and, if it halts, contributes this amount of probability to the total halting probability . Let n represent the known rst n bits of , so that n < n + 2 ?n : In order to decide the halting of p, begin an unending but systematic search for all programs that halt, of whatever length, running rst one program then another for longer and longer times (cf. Fig. 1 ) until enough halting programs have been found to account for more than n of the total halting probability 2 . Then either p is among the programs that have halted so far, or else it will never halt, since its subsequent halting would drive the total halting probability above its known upper bound of n + 2 ?n . Note that there is apparently no way of using to solve the halting problem for one n-bit program without solving the halting problem for all other n-bit programs at the same time.
Most of the famous unproved conjectures of mathematics (Fermat's conjecture, Goldbach's conjecture, the extended Riemann hypothesis, and, until recently, the four-color problem) are conjectures of the nonexistence of something, and would be refuted by a single nite counterexample. Fermat's conjecture, for example, would be refuted by nding a solution to the equation x n +y n = z n in positive integers with n > 2; Riemann's hypothesis by nding a misplaced zero of the zeta function. Such conjectures are equivalent to the assertion that some program, which searches systematically for the allegedly nonexistent object, will never halt.
Interesting conjectures of this sort are generally su ciently simple to describe that they can be encoded in the halting of small programs, a few thousands or tens of thousands of bits long. Thus only the rst few thousand digits of would be needed in principle to solve these outstanding \ nitely refutable" conjectures as well as any others of comparable simplicity that might be thought of in the future. 3 An important class of statements decidable by are statements of the form \proposition p is provable in axiomatic system A". As indicated in the rst essay, given a description of the axioms and rules of inference of A, it is possible to e ectively enumerate all possible proofs within the system, and hence all provable statements. Assuming that the proposition p and system A together require n bits to describe, there is a certain program of about n bits which will halt if and only if p is provable in A. Thus, for any proposition p and axioms A simple enough to be \interesting", the rst few thousand bits of su ce to decide among the three possibilities: p is provable in A, p is refutable in A, or p is independent of A. Another consequence of the enumerability of proofs, 3 Some well-known conjectures, e.g. that is normal, or that there are in nitely many twin primes (consecutive odd primes like 3 and 5 or 17 and 19), or that there are only nitely many primes of the form 2 n + 1, are not in principle decidable one way or the other by any nite amount of direct evidence. Perhaps the most important conjecture of this sort is the P 6 = NP conjecture in computational complexity theory, which holds that there are problems for which the validity of a guessed solution can be tested quickly, but for which solutions cannot be found quickly. Logically, such higher level conjectures involve multiple quanti ers such as 89 \for in nitely many", while nitely refutable conjectures, i.e. those equivalent to the statement that a certain program will not halt, involve only a single quanti er 8 \for all". Although higher level conjectures cannot be directly decided by , there is good reason to believe that many of them, including most of the interesting ones, could be decided indirectly, as logical consequences of stronger, nitely refutable conjectures. For example, many twin primes are known, and empirical evidence indicates that the spacing between them grows rather slowly. Thus the twin prime conjecture may be viewed as an unnecessarily weak form of a stronger but still probably true assertion about the spacing of twin primes, say that there is always at least one pair of twin primes between 10 n and 10 n+1 . This stronger conjecture would be decided by the early digits of , since it is equivalent to the nonhalting of a simple program that looks for an excessively large gap the distribution of twin primes. Conversely, the assertion that there are only nitely many primes of the form 2 n + 1 may be viewed as an unnecessarily weak form of the assertion that there are fewer than, say, 10 100 such primes, or some other easily-named large number (in fact only six are known). Like the strengthened form of the twin prime conjecture, this assertion is equivalent to the non-halting of a simple program, one that looks for the 10 100 'th prime of the speci ed form. Similarly, the normality of and the inequality of P and NP would follow from stronger, nitely refutable statements supported by the same evidence as the original conjectures. In all these cases the nitely refutable statement is obtained by assuming a generous but computable bound on one of the original statement's existential quanti ers. Aside from these conjectures, which probably follow from nitely refutable ones, there are some mathematical statements that de nitely cannot be reduced to halting problems. Typical of these are some statements about itself, e.g. \the j'th bit of is a 1". By virtue of the incompressibility of , the rst n members of this family of two-quanti er statements 10 cannot be decided by any algorithm smaller than about n bits. This implies, incidentally, that no irrational number can e ciently encode the decision of all higher level statements the way encodes the decision of all nitely refutable ones.
as mentioned earlier, is Chaitin's form of G odel's theorem: even though most integers are algorithmically random, no axiomatic system describable in n bits can prove randomness for integers much larger than n bits. provides a strong converse to this theorem: its rst n bits constitute a su cient \axiom" to decide the randomness of all integers of n+1 bits or less. The procedure for doing this is essentially the same as that used to solve the halting problem: to nd whether a given n+1 bit integer x is algorithmically random, use n as described earlier to nd all n-bit programs that halt. If none of these has x as its output, then by de nition x is algorithmically random. Let us now return to the senses in which itself is random: its incompressibility and the impossibility of successfully gambling against it. It may appear strange that can contain so much information about the halting problem and yet be computationally indistinguishable from a meaningless random sequence generated by tossing a coin. In fact, is a totally informative message, a message which appears random because all redundancy has been squeezed out of it, a message which tells us only things we don't already know.
To show that is incompressible, let p be a program that for some n computes n , the rst n bits of . This program may be altered, increasing its size by at most c bits (c a constant independent of n), so that instead of printing n it nds and prints out the rst algorithmically random (n + 1)-bit number, as explained above. This would be a contradiction unless the original program p were at least n ? c bits long.
No nitely describable computable gambling scheme can win an in nite pro t betting against the bits of . Let G be a gambling scheme, describable in g bits, and able to multiply the gambler's initial capital 2 k fold by betting on some number n of initial bits of . Without loss of generality we may suppose that the scheme includes a speci cation of the desired gain 2 k , and that it quits as soon as this gain is achieved, making no further bets. One may imagine the same gambling scheme applied to other inputs besides . On most of them it would fail to achieve its goal, but on some it would succeed. Indeed one may use G to enumerate all the nite inputs on which G would quit successfully. This set has total probability 2 ?k or less, of which 2 ?n is contributed by n .
It can be shown 10 that about n ? k bits su ce to locate n within this enumeration of successful inputs. Therefore n can be computed by a program of approximately g + n ? k bits. This means, in turn, that k cannot be much greater than g without violating the incompressibility of . Therefore no g-bit gambling scheme betting on can multiply the initial capital by more than about 2 g , the amount one would win by simply knowing g bits of and betting only on those bits.
Throughout history philosophers and mystics have sought a compact key to universal wisdom, a nite formula or text which, when known and understood, would provide the answer to every question. The Bible, the Koran, the mythical secret books of Hermes Trismegistus, and the medieval Jewish Cabala have been so regarded. Sources of universal wisdom are traditionally protected from casual use by being hard to nd, hard to understand when found, and dangerous to use, tending to answer more and deeper questions than the user wishes to ask. Like God the esoteric book is simple yet undescribable, omniscient, and transforms all who know It. The use of classical texts to fortell mundane events is considered supersitious nowadays, yet, in another sense, science is in quest of its own Cabala, a concise set of natural laws which would explain all phenomena. In mathematics, where no set of axioms can hope to prove all true statements, the goal might be a concise axiomatization of all \interesting" true statements.
is in many senses a Cabalistic number. It can be known of, but not known, through human reason. To know it in detail, one would have to accept its uncomputable digit sequence on faith, like words of a sacred text. It embodies an enormous amount of wisdom in a very small space, inasmuch as its rst few thousand digits, which could be written on a small piece of paper, contain the answers to more mathematical questions than could be written down in the entire universe, including all interesting nitely-refutable conjectures. Its wisdom is useless precisely because it is universal: the only known way of extracting from the solution to one halting problem, say the Fermat conjecture, is by embarking on a vast computation that would at the same time yield solutions to all other equally simply-stated halting problems, a computation far too large to be carried out in practice. Ironically, although cannot be computed, it might accidentally be generated by a random process, e.g. a series of coin tosses, or an avalanche that left its digits spelled out in the pattern of boulders on a mountainside. The initial few digits of are thus probably already recorded somewhere in the universe. Unfortunately, no mortal discoverer of this treasure could verify its authenticity or make practical use of it.
The author has received reliable information, from a Source who wishes to remain anonymous, that the decimal expansion of begins = 0:9999998020554253273471801908:::
